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September 2009 
The paper analyzes the common assumption that the EU has little power over taxation. 
We find that the EU’s own taxing power is indeed narrowly circumscribed: Its revenues 
have evolved from rather supranational beginnings in the 1950s towards an increasingly 
intergovernmental system. Based on a comprehensive analysis of EU tax legislation and 
ECJ tax jurisprudence from 1958 to 2007, we show that at the same time, the EU exerts 
considerable regulatory control over the member states’ taxing power and imposes tighter 
constraints on member state taxes than the US federal government imposes on state 
taxation. These findings contradict the standard account of the EU as a regulatory polity 
which specializes in apolitical issues of market creation and leaves political issues to the 
member states: Despite strong safeguards, the EU massively regulates the highly salient 
issue of member state taxation. 
1. Who Taxes? 
Who has taxing power in the EU? Practically all EU scholars give the same answer: 
Only the member states! Taxes, according to Andrew Moravcsik, are largely excluded 
from the EU policy agenda.1 The Member states, notes Giandomenico Majone, show a 
“stubborn resistance to Community interventions in areas such as … taxation”.2 Alec 
Stone Sweet agrees that the “EU governs principally through making rules …; it has 
little capacity to govern through taxation …”.3 James Caporaso also finds it to be “weak 
in terms of the traditional tax and spend functions of government”.4 Joseph Weiler calls 
the EU’s budget “laughably small”.5 And in Tanja Börzel’s analysis of the historical 
evolution of EU competencies, the EU’s tax policy competencies receive constantly low 
scores.6 Loukas Tsoukalis argues that the EU has spent an “inordinate amount of time” 
on tax harmonization “with rather little to show for it.”7 Even if harmonization comes to 
pass, EU policy is said to play but a subordinate role in it.8 Two prominent 
comparativists conclude that “taxation is still firmly in the hands of national 
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1  Moravcsik 2002, 607. 
2  Majone 1996a, 60. 
3  Stone Sweet 2004, 239. 
4  Caporaso, 1996, 39. 
5  Weiler 2000, 235. 
6  Börzel 2005, 223. 
7  Tsoukalis 2005, 127. 
8  Moravcsik 2005, 365.  
- 2 - 
governments.”9 We call this conventional wisdom about the EU’s tax policy abstinence 
the “no taxation thesis”. It has become a folk theorem of EU studies which is often 
stated but hardly ever tested. The purpose of our paper is to finally put it to empirical 
scrutiny. 
The “no taxation thesis” rests on two distinct claims. First, that the EU lacks a genuine 
European tax resource, which would enable it to govern through its own financial 
means independently of the member states. And second, that the EU has very little 
control over national taxation and that, consequently, the member states retain 
substantial tax autonomy. We present supporting evidence for the first claim. We show 
that despite constant calls for the introduction of an EU tax, the finances of the EU have 
become ever more intergovernmental over time. From fairly supranational beginnings in 
the 1950s, the EU drifted towards a system of finance which is largely based on national 
contributions, controlled by the member states, and thus not fundamentally different 
from that of other international organizations such as the UN. We argue that the 
persistent failure to institute a genuine European tax resource is not just a transitional 
phenomenon on the way towards a fiscally potent EU but a structural feature which is 
likely to last. European integration does not follow the precedent of advanced federal 
states which invariably evolved from weak federal taxing powers in the 19th century to 
strong federal taxing powers in the 20th century.10 
The second claim of the “no taxation thesis”, by contrast, is disconfirmed by the 
evidence. Based on a comprehensive data set comprising all secondary tax legislation of 
the Commission and the Council of Ministers and the entire tax jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Justice from 1958 to 2007, we show that the tax policy choices of the 
Member States are increasingly embedded in and constrained by EU institutions. While 
it is still national governments which levy taxes, it is often the EU which determines the 
shape and occasionally even the level of taxation. This holds true not only for indirect 
taxation but in different ways also for direct taxation and, hence, for all important taxes. 
The “no taxation thesis” thus misses a decisive feature of the EU tax regime: While the 
EU lacks taxing power in the conventional, fiscal sense, it exerts considerable 
regulatory power over taxation. Indeed, as a comparison will show, it subjects state 
taxation to stricter regulatory controls than the federal government in the United States 
(US).  
The significance of this finding goes beyond the partial rebuttal of a widely held but 
rarely tested empirical assumption about the EU’s role in an obscure policy field mostly 
left to specialists.11 Taxation is one of the constitutive powers of the modern state, and 
in fact its “source of life”12. This is why Joseph Schumpeter considered public finance 
to be “one of the best starting points”13 for analyzing the logic and historical 
transformation of the state.  It is also why Giandomenico Majone has argued that the 
essential starting point for understanding the EU is to acknowledge its fundamental 
fiscal impotence. Given the EU’s lack of an independent taxing power, Majone argues, 
it is constrained to govern by non-fiscal means, i.e. by rules and regulations. In contrast 
                                                 
9  Newton and van Deth 2005, 332. 
10  E.g. McKay 2001. 
11  Major exceptions are Puchala 1984 and Radaelli 1997. 
12  Karl Marx cited in Campbell 1993, 164. 
13  Schumpeter [1918] 1991, 101. Next to Schumpeter’s classic, major works in this tradition include 
Goldscheid 1917; Mann 1934; O’Connor 1973; Levi 1988; and Steinmo 1993. 
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to its tax-heavy member states, it is a purely regulatory polity.14 The view of the EU 
gaining control of apolitical market regulation and the member states retaining control 
of politically salient issues of taxation, spending and other core state activities has 
become something like the standard model of the Euro-Polity.  
Our analysis of the “no taxation thesis” has important implications for this model. It 
confirms that the EU is, and is likely to remain, a “regulatory polity” with little fiscal 
discretion as the model suggests. It also shows, however, that the substantive scope of 
EU regulation is much broader than the model assumes. It concerns not only highly 
technical matters of market governance with negligible redistributive side-effects but 
also constrains the member states’ power to tax, a highly political issue of redistributive 
and ideological conflict. In contrast to national regulators, the EU regulates not only 
markets and the conduct of private market actors but also politics and the conduct of 
governments. Paradoxically, it is the purported protections of national tax autonomy 
(the lack of a genuine EU tax, the restricted tax policy mandate of EU institutions, and 
the unanimity requirement in tax harmonization) that promote restrictive European tax 
regulation.  
In section two, we develop the standard view of the EU as a multilevel regulatory 
polity. Sections three and four provide empirical analyses of the two parts of the “no 
taxation thesis”. Section five summarizes the main findings and contrasts the tax orders 
of the EU and the US. Section six explores implications of our analysis for the standard 
regulatory polity model of the EU.  
2. The Standard Model: A Multilevel Regulatory Polity 
Since the 1990s, an increasing number of scholars have converged around the notion of 
the EU as a system of multilevel governance. The major advantage of this notion, and 
arguably one reason behind its success in EU studies, is to liberate the debate on the 
“nature of the beast”15 from the categorical distinctions between unconstrained national 
sovereignty and a European superstate, between pure intergovernmentalism and pure 
federalism, which had stifled it since the 1960s. Most analysts now agree that authority 
in the EU is neither completely monopolized by member state governments nor by EU 
institutions but is shared between them.16 Most authors also agree that this sharing of 
authority follows a specific pattern that differs markedly from the one found in Western 
states.  
The key feature of the Western state is its monopoly of the legitimate use of force.17 
Other features include state control of taxation, education, and large-scale 
redistribution.18 Systematic accounts of EU decision making powers invariably show 
                                                 
14  Majone 1996a, 65-66. 
15  Risse-Kappen 1996. Major contributions to this debate include Beck and Grande 2007; Caporaso 
1996; Haas 1971; Marks, Hooghe and Blank 1996; Majone 1994; Puchala 1972; Ruggie 1993; and 
Schmitter 1996. 
16  This includes authors as diverse as Moravcsik 2005, 364 fn. 69; Hooghe and Marks, 2001; 
Jachtenfuchs, 2001; Leibfried and Pierson 1995; Scharpf 1999; Bache and Flinders 2004, and Kohler-
Koch and Eising 1999. See Pollack 2005, 379-87 for an overview. 
17  Weber 1978 [1922], 54-56; Poggi 1990, 4-18. 
18  C.f. Zürn and Leibfried 2005; Offe 1998, 103. See also Tilly 1985 for a historical argument. 
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low scores for these key policy areas:19 The EU has neither the legal mandate nor the 
political means for independent policy activities in defense, law and order policies, 
taxation, spending, or education. Decision-making in these areas is by 
intergovernmental agreement, tightly controlled by the member states and with little 
input from, and role for supranational institutions such as the European Commission, 
the European Parliament, or the European Court of Justice. The EU scores high, by 
contrast, in all policy fields related to market creation (e.g. removal of barriers to 
movement, or monetary integration) and market regulation (e.g. occupational health and 
safety policies, environmental and consumer protection, or anti-trust). In these rather 
technical areas of low political salience, EU institutions have a broad mandate for 
action. Decision-making is by qualified majority voting in the Council or delegated to 
independent supranational bodies such as the European Commission or the European 
Central Bank.  
These findings have congealed to what could be called the “standard model” of the 
Euro-Polity. The key feature of this model is a specific pattern of vertical power sharing 
which different scholars describe in remarkably similar terms. According to Simon Hix 
“The EU is a multilevel system of government, which allows European citizens to make 
decisions about regulation of the continent-wide market at the European level while 
maintaining power over taxation and spending at the national level”.20 Liesbet Hooghe 
and Gary Marks agree: “policies that redistribute income among individuals are handled 
almost exclusively within national states, whereas policies having to do with trade and 
market integration are handled almost exclusively at the European level.”21 So does 
Andrew Moravcsik: “The EU’s current activities are restricted by treaty and practice to 
a modest subset of the substantive activities pursued by the modern state. Its mandate 
focuses primarily on the regulation of policy externalities resulting from cross-border 
economic activities. […] Absent concerns include taxation and the setting of fiscal 
priorities, social welfare provision, defense and police powers, education policy, 
cultural policy”22 and a host of other non-economic policy activities. In brief, the EU 
regulates the market and the member states do all the rest including taxes.23 The EU is 
not a state but a regulatory polity.24  
We do not claim that broad agreement on this standard model of vertical power sharing 
in the EU puts all controversy among EU scholars to rest. An important disagreement 
persists with respect to the relative autonomy of the different levels in the Euro-Polity. 
While Andrew Moravcsik in particular has argued that the member states are still in 
control of the EU’s basic constitutional architecture,25 others, like Gary Marks and 
                                                 
19  The first systematic measure of decision-making authority in the EU was provided by Lindberg 1971, 
69. Updates and modifications have been provided by Schmitter 1996; Börzel 2005; and Hooghe und 
Marks 2008. 
20  Hix 2008, 11. 
21  Hooghe and Marks 2008, 115. 
22  Moravcsik 2002, 607.  
23  For substantially similar accounts also see Streeck 1995, 395; Börzel 2005, 224; Hooghe and Marks 
2008, 115; Héritier 1999; Alesina and Spolaore 2003, 210-211, and Caporaso 1996, 39. 
24  C.f. Majone 1996a, 1996b and 2005. In his later work, Majone has dropped his initial reference to the 
EU as a regulatory state in favor of regulatory polity.  
25 Moravcsik 1998. C.f. Pollack 2007 and Schimmelfenning 2004 for summarizing discussions of this 
approach. 
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Liesbet Hooghe have strongly objected to this “state-centric” claim.26 We do claim, 
however, that there is little controversy about four major points:  
1. Independent EU policy making is largely restricted to highly technical and 
politically inconspicuous issues of market regulation.  
2. The member states retain control of highly politicized non-regulatory functions 
such as taxation, defense, large-scale redistribution or education.  
3. This pattern of power sharing between the EU and the member states is 
normatively attractive. As the EU is not a full-blown democracy, it is patently 
unfit to handle politically salient conflicts of distribution or ideology. Since non-
regulatory tax and spend policies are prone to such conflicts, they should be left 
to national governments. The EU is uniquely fit, by contrast, to handle Pareto-
improving issues of market creation and regulation. These issues are largely 
immune to distributive conflict because they increase allocative efficiency, 
decrease market failure, and thus potentially benefit everyone.27 In general, 
voters pay little attention to them. Hence, the EU’s democratic deficit is not a 
disadvantage. In fact, it may be an advantage because it insulates the EU from 
the party politics and special interest group pressures that allegedly often corrupt 
regulation in national democracies.  
4. This normatively attractive pattern of vertical power sharing is reflected in, and 
sustained by, Treaty restrictions on the EU’s range of policy instruments 
(basically limited to rules and regulation), policy mandate (broad in regulation, 
narrow in other fields) and decision making powers (high and supranational in 
regulation, low and intergovernmental in other fields). 
Our empirical test of the “no taxation thesis” has obvious implications for this standard 
account of EU multilevel governance. Should we find that either EU institutions have 
access to independent sources of revenue or that they interfere substantially with 
national tax policy choices, this account would seem in need of modification and 
normative re-evaluation.  
3. No EU Taxing Power 
At first glance, there is substantial evidence for the “no taxation thesis”. Unlike its 
member states, the EU has neither the legal mandate nor the administrative means to 
impose compulsory payments on individuals or corporations: It has no taxing power. 
This is not for lack of trying. The introduction of a genuine EU tax is a perennial issue 
in European politics. The Commission, supported by various expert panels and pro-
European policy-makers, has fought for it since the 1960s, claiming, inter alia, that 
European taxes would improve market integration, facilitate the operation of monetary 
union, and bring the EU closer to the citizen by establishing a direct fiscal link to 
them.28  
                                                 
26  See in particular Marks, Hooghe and Blank 1996 and also Hooghe and Marks 2001, 2003 and 2008.  
27  This argument has been forcefully made by Majone 1998; Moravcsik 2002; and Scharpf 1999.  
28  See e.g. Neumark Report 1963, 151; MacDougall Report 1977; European Commission 1998, 13-14; 
European Commission 2004, 9-12. 
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Despite these efforts, the EU is no closer to having a tax of its own today than the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was back in the 1950s. In fact, it is 
further away because, as we will show, the importance of tax-like supranational levies 
for funding the Community budget has decreased, and the importance of national 
contributions has increased over time. There is a pervasive trend towards 
intergovernmentalism in EU finance. The so-called system of own resources gravitates 
towards a funding scheme which is essentially similar to that of international 
institutions such as the UN.29 
The ECSC Treaty of 1951 contained the seeds of a genuine European power to tax.30 It 
empowered the High Authority to impose supranational levies on the production of coal 
and steel, and gave it considerable discretion to autonomously set the rate and base of 
levy. The levies were collected directly by the ECSC from individual coal and steel 
companies without any administrative assistance from the member states and thus 
closely resembled supranational taxes.31 
The Treaty on the European Economic Community (EEC) of 1957 also provided for a 
supranational system of Community finance, the so-called system of “own Community 
resources”.32 In 1970, the Council designated customs duties and agricultural levies as 
the Community’s first own resources. As in the case of the ECSC levies, the rate and 
the base of these “traditional own resources” are set by EU institutions (in the 
framework of the common commercial policy and the common agricultural policy 
respectively), and they are charged directly on economic agents (importers and 
agricultural producers), thus creating a direct, tax-like fiscal link between the 
Community and individual or corporate citizens. Unlike ECSC levies, the traditional 
own resources are collected by national rather than European authorities and pass 
through national budgets rather than directly to the European budget.33 Since the agents 
paying customs duties or agricultural levies are mostly corporate actors, the traditional 
own resources failed to create the visible fiscal link between the European institutions 
and the European citizenship at large which the Commission and other ardent 
supporters of a federal Europe had longed for. Also, they serve primarily non-fiscal 
objectives such as trade liberalization and the stabilization of agricultural prices. It was 
obvious from the beginning, therefore, that they could not match the rising revenue 
requirements of the Community. 
The so-called VAT34 resource, introduced in 1979, was supposed to alleviate both 
problems. Envisaged as a European deduction of up to 1 per cent from national VATs 
(so-called “base-on-base method” because it piggy-backed the base of the European 
VAT resource onto the national VAT base), it would have allowed the Community to 
tap into a buoyant source of revenue and at the same time would have increased the 
Community’s profile as a revenue raiser in its own right. However, the implementation 
of the base-on-base method required a complete harmonization of national VAT bases 
because otherwise member states could have reduced their contributions to the 
European budget simply by curtailing their national VAT bases. While the Council 
                                                 
29  E.g. Heinemann, Mohl and Osterloh 2008. 
30  C.f. Articles 49 and 50 of the ECSC Treaty. 
31  Strasser 1992, 74. 
32  Art. 201 EC Treaty (now Art. 269). 
33  Strasser 1992, 88-90. 
34  VAT = value added tax. 
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achieved a substantial approximation in 1977, a complete harmonization proved elusive. 
This made the base-on-base approach unfeasible and tipped the scales in favor of a 
purely statistical approach to collecting the VAT resource (so-called “revenue 
method”).35  
The revenue method was administratively convenient but fundamentally changed the 
character of the VAT resource from a direct European charge on final consumers to a 
national contribution of the member states. Despite its name, the VAT resource is not 
directly linked to the VAT payments of European consumers but represents a national 
payment obligation of the member states. In essence, it is a purely statistical construct, 
calculated from harmonized data on aggregate national consumption, paid out of general 
tax revenue, and transferred to the EU in monthly installments. Critical observers 
consider it as “revenue dressed up as an own resource”36 but not as a genuine own 
resource.  
The introduction of the so-called GNI-resource37 in 1988 reinforced the drift from 
supranational levies to national contributions. In contrast to the VAT resource which at 
least initially was intended to have certain tax-like features, the GNI resource was 
conceived right from the beginning as a transfer from national treasuries. It is calculated 
on the basis of harmonized data on the gross national income of the member states 
without even nominal reference to microeconomic events or actors. The GNI resource 
has quickly turned into the key stone of the own resource system. In 2007, it accounted 
for roughly 70 per cent of all own resources. Current reform trends point towards a 
further expansion of its role in EU finance.38  
                                                 
35  Genschel 2002, 80-95. Denmark used the fiscal base-on-base method until 1982, Ireland until 1985. 
Afterwards, all member states applied the statistical revenue method c.f. Strasser 1992, 91. 
36  Strasser 1992, 90; c.f. Laffan 1997, 41. 
37  Until 1995, this resource was calculated on the basis of the gross national product (GNP resource). 
Since then, it is calculated on the basis of the gross national income (GNI resource). 
38  E.g. Grybauskaité 2008. 
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Figure 1: EU Own Resources as a Percentage of Total EU Revenue, 1971-2007 
 
Source: European Commission 2004 and http://eur-lex.europa.eu/budget/www/index-
en.htm (last accessed Sep 27, 2009),  own calculations 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the pervasive trend in the EU’s own resources away from direct 
charges on individual or corporate citizens towards national contributions of the 
member states, i.e. away from a genuine supranational power to tax towards an 
intergovernmental revenue system. In 2007, almost 85 per cent of EU revenues derived 
from national contributions, i.e. the VAT and the GNI resources. Only 15 per cent came 
from tax-like traditional own resources. While the High Authority of the ECSC enjoyed 
considerable discretion to set and administer ECSC levies, the EU Commission can only 
propose rates and bases of EU own resources which then have to be adopted 
unanimously by the Council, ratified by the parliaments of the member states, and 
administered by national tax authorities.39  
The trend towards national contributions in EU finance is reflected in, and propelled by, 
concerns about inter-nation distributive justice. These concerns emerged after British 
entry in 1973, and almost paralyzed the EU after Margaret Thatcher demanded “our 
money back” in 1979.40 The budget rebate for the UK solved this particular problem in 
1984 but at the price of drawing other member states’ attention to their budgetary net-
positions.41 By increasing the number of net-contributors to the EU budget, consecutive 
rounds of enlargement further increased the salience of distributive conflicts among the 
member states. As a consequence, the main cleavage in European budgetary debates is 
not between social classes as within the member states but between states. The 
normative reference point is inter-nation equity and the principle of the national ability 
                                                 
39  See Pietras 2008, 16. 
40  See Laffan 1997, 52. 
41  See Laffan 1997, 54. 
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to pay as in other international institutions, not inter-person equity and the principle of 
the individual ability to pay as in domestic politics. This explains why there are member 
state specific contribution rates to the VAT resource. Next to the UK, special rates also 
apply to Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden, and a base cap is granted to 
member states with large VAT bases.42 The increasing intergovernmentalism in the EU 
budget may also help to explain its relatively modest size. While in Western federal 
states, the huge task expansion of the federal government since the early 20th century 
was accompanied by a huge expansion of the federal budget,43 the EU’s task expansion 
since the early 1990s was accompanied by a stagnation of the budget.  
Many observers perceive the trend towards intergovernmental EU finance as 
pathological. According to the Commission, it fosters “a narrow ‘juste retour’ stance” 44 
of the member states and deflects attention from the benefits of EU policies for Europe 
as a whole. A direct fiscal link between the European institutions and the citizen could 
help to reduce this bias and vindicate the EU as “a Union of Member states and 
citizens”.45 The quest for a genuine European tax continues.46 However, its visionary 
appeal testifies to its lack of political plausibility. The creation of a genuine European 
taxing power is not on the agenda because it would bestow a degree of stateness on the 
EU that seems less acceptable to governments and citizens with every round of 
enlargement.  
4. The EU’s Regulatory Power over Taxation 
While the EU has no taxes of its own, and is unlikely to get some any time soon, it has 
the power to regulate the taxes of the member states. As we will show, this power to 
regulate goes far beyond what is implied by the standard model of the EU as a 
regulatory polity.  
The EU’s regulatory power over taxation derives from its competence for the Single 
Market. The Single Market is defined as an “area without internal frontiers in which the 
free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured”47. To complete this 
market, the EU has to intervene in national policies creating such frontiers. Since goods, 
persons, services, and capital constitute the major tax bases of the member states (in fact 
there is hardly anything else to tax), this residual European power to regulate extends to 
all major taxes. As we will show, the EU institutions have used this power to slowly 
assert considerable control: The member states continue to levy taxes but EU 
institutions increasingly shape them. Two instruments are particularly important in this 
regard: the secondary tax legislation of the Commission and the Council (see section 
4.1) and the case law of the European Court of Justice (see section 4.2).  
                                                 
42  See 2007/436/EC, Euratom, article 2. 
43  See Diaz-Cayeros 2004. 
44  European Commission 2004, technical annex p. 41 emphasis in original. 
45  European Commission 2004, 58, emphasis in original. 
46  See e.g. Le Cacheux 2007, European Commission 2004; Cattoir 2004. 
47  Art. 14 TEC. 
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4.1. Secondary Tax Legislation 
The founding fathers of the EEC clearly understood that market integration requires tax 
policy coordination48 but were concerned to keep the EU’s legislative authority limited 
in this area. The EC Treaty gives some law making powers to EU institutions but 
imposes strict functional and procedural constraints on them. Functionally, it premises 
EU tax legislation on the needs of market integration. It mandates the Council to 
harmonize national tax laws for one purpose only: to ensure the proper functioning of 
the Single Market.49 The fiscal and distributive considerations which animate most 
domestic tax policy debates are thus systematically excluded from the European tax 
policy agenda.50 Procedurally, the Treaty subjects tax matters to unanimous decision-
making. Each member state enjoys veto power over all acts of European tax legislation 
including those serving legitimate purposes of market integration.51 In contrast to many 
other policy fields, proposals to introduce qualified majority voting were invariably 
struck down by sovereignty-minded member states in taxation. Arguably, taxation is 
now the policy field with the highest degree of intergovernmentalism in decision-
making at least in the first pillar of the EU.52 Apparently, some governments have a 
strong desire to keep the EU weak in taxation. However, this has not prevented a strong 
growth of secondary tax legislation. Table 1 gives an overview of all binding secondary 
tax acts ever issued by EU institutions. It highlights four trends. 
                                                 
48  Spaak Bericht 1956, 66-67. 
49  Art. 93 and 94 TEC. Art. 157 (3) TEC even explicitly prohibits the introduction of Community tax 
provisions for the purpose of improving the competitiveness of European industry. 
50  Of course, once a market integration rationale has been established for tax harmonization, other policy 
considerations also come into play (see e.g. European Commission 2001a). Importantly, however, 
they cannot formally justify tax harmonization. Note, however, that Art. 175 TEC empowers the 
Council to unanimously adopt “provisions primarily of a fiscal nature” for purposes of environmental 
protection. 
51  Art. 93; 95 (1); and 190 (5) TEC. 
52  Börzel 2005, 222-23. 
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Table 1: The secondary tax legislation1 of the EU, 1958-2007 
 1958-1967 1968-1977 1978-1987 1988-1997 1998-2007
by tax area       
VAT 2 6.52 24 79 94.5 
Excise 0 7.5 15 30 65.5 
Corporate tax 0 0 0 2 3 
Personal Income 
tax 0 0 0 0 11 
Administrative 
Cooperation and 
miscellaneous tax 0 6 2 9 25 
by legal instrument      
Regulations 0 0 0 8 13 
Directives 2 19 35 35 39 
Decisions 0 1 6 77 147 
by issuing institution      
Council 2 20 41 109 179 
Commission 0 0 0 11 20 
      
Total tax legislation  2 20 41 120 199 
Source: Eur-Lex, own calculations 
Notes: 1secondary tax legislation refers to binding legislative acts of the Council or the Commission 
concerning the national tax policy of the member states. Non-binding recommendations, opinions, etc. are 
not included. Also not included are binding acts concerning the customs code, state aid law or own 
resources. 2Some directives pertain to VAT and excises alike, for example directives on tax exemptions 
for individual travellers. They have been counted as 0.5 against each of these taxes.  
 
First, the production of secondary tax law has greatly increased. While the Community 
of six issued only two tax acts in its first decade, the EU of 15 and later of 25 member 
states passed almost 200 tax acts between 1998 and 2007. Despite strict functional and 
procedural Treaty constraints, the adoption of secondary tax law is now a routine affair 
in EU politics. 
Second, the number of tax areas covered by secondary tax law has increased. In the 
1960s, the focus of EU tax legislation was exclusively on the introduction of a common 
VAT system.53 In the 1970s and 1980s, EU tax legislation extended to excises. The 
Council agreed on common rules for indirect tax exemptions for individual travelers,54 
                                                 
53  See 67/2277EEC and 67/228/EEC. 
54  E.g. 69/169/EEC. 
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and for tobacco taxation55, and also made its first cautious advance into regulating the 
administrative cooperation among national tax authorities.56 In the 1990s, it entered the 
corporate tax field by passing two directives on the taxation of multinational 
companies.57 In 2003, EU tax legislation extended into personal income tax with the so-
called savings tax directive.58 As a result, the four major taxes (VAT, excises, personal 
income tax and corporate tax), which together account for roughly 85 per cent of EU-27 
total tax revenue,59 are now covered by EU tax law. However, as Table 1 also shows, 
the coverage is very uneven. The vast majority of secondary EU tax law concerns 
indirect taxation (mostly VAT and excises) while the number of direct tax acts 
(corporate and personal income tax) is rather low. Closer inspection reveals that the 
systems, base definitions, rate structures and administrative procedures of VAT and 
excise taxes are regulated comprehensively and in great detail while the harmonization 
of direct taxation remains rather sketchy.60 The difference in coverage and detail also 
shows in the different length of harmonization directives. While the new VAT systems 
directive61 covers 118 pages of the EU’s Official Journal, all corporate tax directives62 
taken together cover only sixteen pages. 
Third, the variety of legal instruments has grown. In the first thirty years of integration, 
the directive was virtually the only instrument of secondary tax legislation. As the 
directive is binding only with respect to the ends to be achieved but leaves some 
discretion as to the means by which to achieve them, it was the instrument of choice for 
imposing unity on widely diverging national tax regimes. Indeed, it is still the preferred 
instrument for major acts of tax harmonization such as the horizontal excises directive 
of 1992,63 the savings directive of 2003, the introduction of the transitional system of 
VAT in 1991,64 or the new VAT system directive in 2006.65 However, since the late 
1980s the number of tax policy decisions has rapidly increased and has overtaken the 
number of directives in the 1990s. Decisions are mostly used to authorize specific 
derogations from general harmonization directives for individual member states. Given 
that indirect taxes are much more thoroughly harmonized than direct taxes, most of 
these derogations concern VAT and the major excises. In a way, they provide a safety 
valve against an overly restrictive harmonization of these taxes. The accelerated growth 
of tax decisions thus provides prima facie evidence of the increasing restrictiveness of 
EU tax harmonization and testifies to the high level of European involvement in 
national tax policy making. Finally, regulations have also become somewhat more 
common since the 1980s even though their absolute number is still quite low. Since 
regulations are binding both with respect to the political ends to be achieved and the 
means by which to achieve them, and since they are directly applicable within the 
national legal orders of the member states, member state governments usually avoid 
them in sensitive areas. In the field of taxation, they are mostly used to lay down 
                                                 
55  72/464/EEC. 
56  77/799/EEC. 
57  90/434/EEC and 90/435/EEC. 
58  2003/48/EC. 
59  Own calculations based on Eurostat 2007. 
60  For a short summary of the state of play in EU tax harmonization see Uhl 2007. 
61  2006/112/EC. 
62  90/434/EEC; 90/435/EEC; and 2003/49/EC. 
63  92/12/EEC. 
64  91/680/EEC. 
65  2006/112/EC. 
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implementing provisions for other secondary tax law, especially harmonization 
directives66.  
Fourth, there is a mild trend towards delegated tax legislation. While in the early 
decades, all tax acts emanated from the Council of Ministers, more recently a small but 
increasing number of decisions and regulations have been issued by the Commission. 
The legal basis is provided by “parent” legislation of the Council which delegates law 
making powers for specific purposes to the Commission. The horizontal excise 
directive, for example, delegates authority over some administrative aspects of the 
common excise system.67 The new VAT system directive empowers the Commission to 
regulate reduced tax rates for gas, electricity and district heating.68 While the 
substantive scope of delegation is limited, it is still remarkable that law-making powers 
are delegated at all given the member states’ strong insistence on retaining tax 
autonomy. 
In short, the evidence suggests that the frequency, coverage, and variety of tax 
legislation have greatly increased. A growing number of issues concerning the rate, 
shape and administration of national taxes are now formally decided by the Commission 
and the Council. However, the evidence also shows that the scope of legislation varies 
greatly across taxes. Indirect taxes and especially VAT and the major excises are 
regulated comprehensively by secondary law while direct taxation is hardly regulated at 
all. This does not mean, however, that direct taxation remains free of European 
constraints because since the mid-1980s, the ECJ has developed a large body of case 
law on the compatibility of direct tax rules with primary EU law. 
4.2. ECJ Tax Jurisprudence 
The legal order of the EU empowers the ECJ to review the consistency of national law, 
including tax law, with the acquis communautaire. Cases can be brought by other 
member states, by the Commission or by private tax payers via the preliminary rulings 
procedure. Each tax case concerns a particular tax rule in a particular member state but 
the resulting case law has a harmonizing effect across taxes and member states because, 
by providing detailed reasons why the particular rule is (not) in line with EU law, it 
establishes general principles of acceptable tax policy for the EU as a whole.69 Table 2 
provides a quantitative overview of the tax jurisprudence of the ECJ. It highlights four 
trends. 
 
                                                 
66  E.g. Council Regulation (EC) No 1777/2005 of 17 October 2005 or Commission Regulation (EC) 
No 2023/2005 of 12 December 2005. 
67  92/12/EEC, Art. 24. 
68  2006/112/EC, Art. 102. 
69  For a general treatment of this issue, see Stone Sweet 2004, 30-35. 
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Table 2: Tax jurisprudence1 of the ECJ, 1958-2007 
 1958-1967 1968-1977 1978-1987 1988-1997 1998-2007
by tax area       
VAT 1 17 33.52 116 208 
Excise and other 
indirect tax 2 19 49.52 68 102 
Corporate tax 0 1 2 8 46.54 
Personal tax3 1 2 2 12 54,54 
Administrative 
Cooperation and 
miscellaneous tax 0 0 1 5 6 
by legal subject       
Primary law 4 29 56 68 124.55 
Secondary law 0 10 32 141 292.55 
by type of procedure      
Preliminary ruling 3 32 64 158 340 
Infringement 
(failure to fulfil 
obligation) 1 5 24 49 68 
Other 0 2 0 2 9 
      
Total tax 
jurisprudence  4 39 88 209 417 
Source: Eur-lex, own calculations 
Notes: 1tax jurisprudence refers to judgements of the ECJ on the compatibility of national tax 
law and European law. Orders as well as judgements on the EU’s own resources are not included. The 
categorization of cases as tax jurisprudence does not follow the register of the ECJ because this register 
counts as tax cases only cases which have been decided on the basis of either primary tax law (the ‘tax 
chapter’ of the TEC) or secondary tax law. It thus misses many direct tax cases which have been decided 
on the basis of general treaty provisions on non-discrimination, the four freedoms or competition policy. 
2Some judgements apply to VAT and excises. They are counted as 0,5 against each tax. 3Personal tax 
includes income, wealth, and inheritance taxes. 4Some judgements apply to corporate and personal taxes. 
They are counted as 0.5 against each tax. 5Some judgements refer to primary and secondary law. They are 
counted as 0.5 against each legal subject. 
 
 
First, the absolute number of tax cases has grown. While the ECJ handled only four tax 
cases between 1958 and 1967, it processed more than 400 such cases between 1998 and 
2007. 
Second, the number of tax areas covered has risen. For a long time, the tax 
jurisprudence of the Court focused almost exclusively on indirect taxes (mostly VAT 
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and excises). Since the 1990s, however, the number of direct tax cases (mostly 
concerning corporate and personal income taxes) has grown significantly. While the 
ECJ rendered only twenty judgments on direct taxation between 1988 and 1997, this 
number increased to 101 between 1998 and 2007. The relative share of direct tax cases 
grew from less than ten per cent of all tax cases (1988-1997) to almost 25 per cent 
(1998-2007). All major taxes are now under constant judicial review by the ECJ. 
Third, the number of cases concerning the interpretation of secondary tax law has grown 
much faster than that of cases concerning primary treaty law. More than 70 per cent of 
the cases rendered between 1998 and 2007 dealt with secondary law (292.5 out of 417). 
Unsurprisingly, a closer inspection reveals that this share is much higher in indirect 
taxation: almost 98 per cent of all VAT cases between 1998 and 2007 (203 out of 208) 
concerned secondary VAT law. The share is much lower in direct taxation where little 
secondary law exists. Only about 20 per cent of the corporate tax cases (10 out of 46.5) 
and no case concerning personal taxes related to secondary tax law.70  In other words, in 
indirect taxation the ECJ rules on the secondary legislation of the Council while in 
direct taxation it mostly rules in lieu of Council legislation. In the former case, the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ adds to the legal constraints of secondary tax legislation 
because, by clarifying the meaning of this legislation it tends to whittle away some of 
the formula compromises and ambiguities which originally secured unanimous 
agreement in the Council. In the later case, it creates judge-made European tax law in a 
field in which the Council has traditionally refused to legislate because the member 
states could not or would not agree to European level rules. In other words: ”While 
European Union governments do their best to avoid harmonizing [direct] taxation, the 
EU’s court of justice is busy doing it for them.”71 
Most direct tax cases concern the compatibility of national tax provisions with the 
general non-discrimination and free movement guarantees of the EC Treaty.72 Direct tax 
regimes are liable to violating these guarantees because historically they were designed 
to ensure efficiency and distributive fairness within national boundaries rather than non-
discrimination and unrestricted movement across them. Governments built up protective 
walls around national tax domains in order to prevent the mobile tax base from leaking 
out: Tax advantages were limited to domestic situations, and extra tax or administrative 
requirements were imposed on international situations. The ECJ has taken a very critical 
view of these protective arrangements, and beginning in the 1980s, started to shoot them 
down in the name of the market freedoms. An in-depth analysis of the corporate tax 
jurisprudence suggests that the member states lost almost three-quarters of all cases.73 
This judicial onslaught triggered a wave of national tax reforms. Governments in 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy and elsewhere eliminated the once popular but 
inherently discriminatory imputation system of corporate taxation. Also, domestic tax 
advantages were extended to cross-border situations or eliminated altogether in order to 
pre-empt anti-discrimination litigation. Indirectly, the ECJ’s tax jurisprudence also 
affected national tax rates because by eliminating tax barriers to cross-border 
                                                 
70  The only exception is case C-87/99 (Zurstrassen) which amongst other issues dealt with the 
implications of the non-tax Council Regulation 1612/68/EEC for personal income taxation. 
71  The Economist cited in Kaye 2007, 195. 
72  For more detail see Terra and Wattel 2005, 27-197; Aujean 2007; and van Thiel 2007. 
73  Genschel, Kemmerling, and Seils forthcoming, table 2 
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transactions it fuelled corporate tax competition in the Single Market.74 The corporate 
tax jurisprudence also had important knock-on effects on personal taxation, for example 
as regards the treatment of individual wealth and capital income.75 Most tax lawyers 
agree that the ECJ “strongly influences almost all aspects of company tax law”76 and 
deeply affects the taxation of individual income and wealth.77  
Fourth, Table 2 shows that the tax jurisprudence of the ECJ is driven by two types of 
proceedings, references for preliminary rulings and infringement procedures. 
Preliminary rulings have always outnumbered infringement procedures by a significant 
margin. In recent years (1998-2007), the ratio has been five to one (340 to 68). The 
predominance of the preliminary rulings procedure gives the tax litigation before the 
ECJ a tax reduction bias because private tax payers will incur the costs of litigation only 
if they expect that a success will reduce their tax bill.78 To the extent that private 
litigants are successful in their actions, as for the reasons just stated they often are, they 
lend encouragement to other potential litigants to follow their example. Thus, successful 
litigation begets more litigation and increases constraints on national tax autonomy. 
Infringement proceedings are almost invariably initiated by the Commission. The 
Commission uses these proceedings in order to ensure member state compliance with 
existing EU law but also to create new law. Targeting tax obstacles which the member 
states refuse to remove by way of legislative harmonization, it hopes to instigate case 
law which removes them by way of judicial harmonization.79 The accumulation of case 
law may then in turn facilitate consensus building on legislative harmonization.80 
5. A Comparison of EU and US Multilevel Governance in 
Taxation 
How does the “no taxation thesis” stand up to empirical scrutiny? The evidence 
presented in this paper supports the first part of the thesis: The EU does not have a 
source of income which even remotely resembles a tax. Despite half a century of trying, 
it has not managed to come closer to gaining the fiscal independence necessary to 
pursue large-scale spending policies on a par with central governments in national 
federations. If anything, the EU’s fiscal independence has decreased. The system of 
“own resources” has become more intergovernmental rather than less. While the 
economic case for a larger and more self-reliant EU budget is an old one, and has 
become stronger with the creation of Economic and Monetary Union,81 the political 
case has become weaker with each round of accessions. By increasing the heterogeneity 
of the member states and by raising uncertainty about future member states, 
enlargement has fundamentally undermined the willingness of national governments to 
consider more fiscal independence for EU institutions. The EU is likely to remain a 
fiscally weak entity for a long time to come.  
                                                 
74  Genschel, Kemmerling, and Seils, forthcoming. 
75  C.f. Terra and Wattel 2005, ch. 3. 
76  European Commission 2001b, 307. 
77  See e.g. Aujean 2007; van Thiel 2007; Terra and Wattel 2005, ch. 3. 
78  Graetz and Warren 2007, 293. 
79  European Commission 2001a, 21. 
80  Aujean 2007, 329. 
81  MacDougall Report 1977. 
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At first glance, there is also support for the second part of the “no taxation thesis”. The 
EU’s regulatory authority is narrowly circumscribed in taxation. Functionally, the EC 
Treaty restricts its law making mandate to matters of market integration: The Council 
may harmonize national taxes only to the extent necessary for the proper functioning of 
the Single Market but for no other purpose. Procedurally, it submits the tax legislation 
of the EU to the unanimity requirement.  
However, this is not the whole story. Tough Treaty restrictions notwithstanding, EU 
institutions have asserted considerable authority over national taxation: Taxes remain 
national but are increasingly constrained by EU legislation and jurisprudence. To be 
sure, the constraining effect varies across taxes. Indirect taxes are more thoroughly 
regulated than direct taxes and corporate taxes more thoroughly than personal income 
taxes. It also varies across tax instruments. Tax systems and tax base definitions tend to 
be more narrowly circumscribed by European rules than tax rates. Most importantly, 
there are no binding European rules on maximum rates. The member states remain free 
to increase rates in order to raise more revenue even though their choice of rate 
structures and minimum rates is subject to legislative constraints in VAT, excises and 
savings taxation and to constraints from tax competition in corporate taxation and 
indirectly also in personal income taxation.82 Obviously, the EU has not totally taken 
over tax policy making but is deeply involved in its regulation. The “no taxation thesis” 
completely misses this crucial point.  
To appreciate the distinctiveness of the EU’s fiscal architecture, compare it to the US. 
We highlight three crucial differences. First, the US federal government has what EU 
institutions conspicuously lack: independent taxing power. Federal taxes accounted for 
56 percent of total US tax revenue (67 percent if social security contributions are 
included) in 2006,83 and the rate, shape and administration of these taxes is under the 
exclusive control of the US Congress. State governments have no vote in, let alone veto 
power over federal taxation. The EU’s own resources by contrast, accounted for roughly 
2 percent of total EU-27 tax revenue in 2007, they resemble national contributions 
rather than taxes, and their rate, shape and administration is fully controlled by the 
member states.  
Second, US federal institutions have more formal authority to regulate state taxation 
than EU institutions. The functional and procedural restrictions on federal law making 
powers are softer. Functionally, the US Congress enjoys essentially unlimited authority 
under the Commerce Clause to regulate state taxes affecting interstate commerce.84 This 
includes the power to constrain state taxation in the interest of interstate commerce but 
also the power to constrain interstate commerce in the interest of the tax autonomy of 
the states. By contrast, the EU Council of Ministers’ tax policy mandate is limited to 
market-enhancing legislation and does not include the protection of national tax 
autonomy. Procedurally, legislation in Congress is not subject to the unanimity 
requirement that governs the EU’s Council of Ministers’ tax decision making. Also, 
state governments have no direct representation in Congress and, hence, cannot interfere 
with, let alone block, federal legislation affecting their taxes.85 Finally, the US Supreme 
Court has clear authority under the Supremacy Clause to strike down state laws that are 
                                                 
82  C.f. Ganghof and Genschel 2008. 
83  OECD 2009, Table E, own calculations. 
84  C.f. Hellerstein 2007, 69. 
85  C.f. McLure 2007, 139. 
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incompatible with the Constitution, including tax laws, on a par with the ECJ’s 
competence to strike down national taxes.    
Third, US federal institutions have used their regulatory authority over state taxation 
much more sparingly than EU institutions. Congress has rarely exercised its Commerce 
Clause power to regulate state taxes.86 While it has recently legislated on issues such as 
state taxation of pension income or internet access,87 it has never engaged in the type of 
general tax harmonization that is the hallmark of EU tax policy. Also, unlike the EU, it 
has not exclusively legislated in the interest of unrestricted interstate commerce but 
occasionally also in order to lift dormant Commerce Clause restrictions on state 
taxation. The permission to the states to require remote vendors to collect sales and use 
taxes for them is a case in point.88 Similarly, the US Supreme Court has treated state 
taxes much more leniently under the US Constitution than the ECJ has treated national 
taxes under the EC Treaty. Oftentimes, it has simply refused to hear cases concerning 
state taxation – something the ECJ cannot do. At other times, it has exercised “an extra 
dose of judicial sympathy for state taxing power”89 – something the ECJ has typically 
been unwilling to do. While the ECJ has consistently refused to accept the revenue 
requirements of the member states as a valid justification for national tax provisions 
impinging upon the Single Market,90 the Supreme Court has paid considerable 
deference to the tax policy needs of state governments, and only struck down the most 
egregious cases of discriminatory state tax laws.91  
Apparently, the “weak” institutions of the EU impose much stronger regulatory 
constraints on state taxation than the “strong” US federal government. Why? The reason 
for this puzzling result is that the very strength of the federal government obviates the 
need for strict constraints on state taxation while the weakness of EU institutions fosters 
it. The fiscal weight of US federal taxation reduces the importance of differences in 
state taxation for the functioning of the national market.92 In the EU, where all taxes are 
national, cross-national tax differences matter much more for market integration. At the 
same time, US federal taxation reduces the likelihood of differences in state taxation. 
The states derive roughly two-thirds of their tax revenues from tax bases “co-occupied” 
by federal taxes.93 Federal tax law therefore serves as a focal reference points for state 
tax legislation and provides for a considerable degree of tax homogeneity across states 
even in the absence of formal tax harmonization.94  
Finally, given the ample scope of federal authority neither Congress nor the Supreme 
Court is bound to approach state taxation from a narrow market integration perspective. 
Rather they can balance the federal interest in fiscally sovereign states against the 
federal interest in an integrated national market. This allows them to be lenient on 
economically restrictive state taxation.95 The EU institutions, by contrast, cannot 
balance national tax autonomy against market integration because, as the EC Treaty 
                                                 
86  C.f. McLure 2007, 134. 
87  C.f. Kaye 2007, 206-210. 
88  C.f. Fox and Swain 2007, 617. 
89  Laurence Tribe cited in Kaye 2007, 225. 
90  C.f. e.g. Terra and Wattel 2005, 81. 
91  C.f. Avi-Yonah 2007, 466. 
92  C.f. Bird 1989, 149. 
93  C.f. Keen 1998, 460. 
94  E.g. Daly and Weiner 1993. 
95  C.f. e.g. Pelkmans 1988, 46. 
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makes clear, taxation is none of their business except where it affects market 
integration. The original idea behind this narrow policy mandate was, of course, to 
safeguard the member states’ autonomy in taxation. The unintended effect is to curtail it 
by delegitimizing revenue considerations in European tax policy discourse. Not only 
has the ECJ consistently refused to accept revenue requirements as a justification for 
restrictive national tax provisions.96 Also in Council negotiations, national revenue 
interests are usually discredited as instances of harmful ”national egoism” rather than 
accepted as matters of common concern. To be sure, revenue considerations are ever 
present and inform national bargaining positions. However, they have to be draped in 
arguments about market integration in order to enter into official Council negotiations. 
This framing biases the secondary tax legislation of the Council towards market 
integration and against the protection of national tax autonomy, and helps to shield 
redistributive implications from public scrutiny.  
If the “height of success” in regulatory policy making is to render distributive 
consequences invisible,97 then the EU’s regulatory tax policy has clearly reached the 
pinnacle. So invisible is its impact on national taxation that it is regularly ignored and 
forgotten in domestic tax policy debate. Hence it is quite common for national parties 
and politicians to campaign on tax policy proposals that conflict with EU law. Nicolas 
Sarkozy, for instance, pledged to reform the structure of French VAT rates in order to 
make the tax more equitable and efficient just to find out, after becoming president, that 
he needed the consent of the other 26 member states for that.98 A more recent example 
concerns the proposal of German Social Democrats in the federal election campaign of 
2009 to introduce a new stock exchange turnover tax. Although the EU capital duty 
directive99 prohibits such as tax, the German political debate proceeded largely as if a 
Social Democratic government could have introduced it unilaterally.100 Even when the 
EU’s impact on national taxation is reflected in domestic discourse, as it is most 
prominently in the case of corporate tax competition, the argument is usually not about 
the equity and legitimacy of this impact but about the ways and means of national 
adjustment to it. Thus there have been numerous, and sometimes vigorous, political 
debates in the member states as to how much to cut national corporate tax rates in order 
to survive in (or profit from) European tax competition but there has been hardly any 
debate about the desirability of tax competition per se simply because the level of 
competition is not a decision variable of national politics. Even the largest member 
states cannot determine it single-handedly.101 We conclude that the EU’s regulatory 
activities in taxation are of low political salience to European voters not because they 
are distributively neutral or ideologically innocent but because they defy political 
contestation and, hence, voter attention.  
The comparison between the EU and the US highlights the essential features of the 
fiscal architecture of the EU: Although it has no independent tax income like the US 
federal government, its influence on taxation is by no means weak as the “no taxation 
thesis” suggests. Precisely because it lacks a tax of its own and must restrict its tax 
                                                 
96  Terra and Wattel 2005, 81. 
97  Mabbett and Schelkle 2009, 700. 
98  EurActiv 2008. 
99  See 2008/7/EC: article 5, para. 2 a. 
100  Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27 July 2009, 9. 
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policy activity to what seems indispensable for the uncontested goal of market 
integration, the EU tightly constrains member state taxation. Its “horizontal” regulation 
of member state taxing powers compensates the lack of a “vertical” delegation of taxing 
powers to EU institutions.  
6. What’s wrong with the Regulatory Polity Model? 
Our analysis of the “no taxation thesis” has important implications for the standard 
model of EU as a multilevel regulatory polity. This model assumes, first of all, that the 
EU is largely confined to regulatory means of policy-making. Our findings confirm that 
the EU focuses on regulation because it lacks autonomous taxing power. They also 
confirm that the focus on regulation is not a transient feature of the EU on its way 
towards eventual fiscal empowerment but one of its enduring attributes: There is no hint 
of the tax centralization that marked the historical development of advanced federal 
states for most of the 20th century. The EU is likely to remain a regulatory polity. 
Second, the standard model claims that EU regulation is largely restricted to technical 
matters of efficient market governance and leaves control of politically salient matters 
such as taxation to the member states. This claim is disconfirmed by our findings. The 
EU has developed a substantial body of tax legislation and jurisprudence which intrudes 
deeply into the tax policy of its member states, much deeper, in fact, than the US federal 
government intrudes into the taxation of US states. We conclude that EU regulation has 
a much broader scope than is commonly understood. From creating and controlling the 
common European market it branches out into controlling and constraining European 
governments. The liberalization and management of cross-border economic activities 
may be its purported goal. The shaping of domestic redistributive policy choices is the 
manifest effect.   
Third, the standard model suggests that the pattern of power sharing in the EU is 
normatively attractive. Our findings provide reasons for doubt. They indicate that the 
regulatory activities of the EU are less distributively innocent than the standard model 
implies. They also intimate that the distributive implications of EU regulation 
systematically escape public scrutiny. In the tax case, at least, these implications are not 
politicized at the EU level because the institutions involved – the Commission, the 
Court, and the Council – lack the means and the mandate to raise, represent and rule on 
conflicts of inter-personal distribution and equity (in contrast to issues of inter-state 
distribution and equity). The distributive implications of EU tax regulation also escape 
politicization at the national level either because they are simply overlooked until they 
actually become felt or because they enter the political discourse as external constraints 
to be accepted as matters of fact and not as decision variables open to contestation and 
political change. As Andreas Føllesdal and Simon Hix remind us, the salience of a 
policy issue is partly endogenous to the political process.102 The tax regulation of the 
EU has low salience in the minds of European voters not because it does not affect them 
in important ways but because it systematically escapes political strife and contestation.  
Finally, the standard model assumes that member state control of taxation and other 
politically salient policies is reflected in, and protected by, the EC Treaty. Again, our 
findings cast doubt on this assumption. To be sure, the Treaty severely constrains the 
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EU’s policy powers in taxation, denying it access to a tax resource of its own, limiting 
its policy mandate to matters of market integration, and subjecting its decision-making 
to the unanimity rule. However, these constraints fail to protect national autonomy and, 
in fact, contribute to its erosion.  
In order to understand this counterintuitive result, consider the lack of a genuine EU tax 
resource first. Intended to deny the EU one of the most powerful instruments, and 
symbols, of national statehood, it unintentionally boosts the need for European tax 
harmonization and regulation. For as long as taxation remains exclusively national, 
cross-national differences in taxation have the largest possible potential to upset the 
Single Market. Hence, by keeping the EU fiscally weak, it increases the demand for 
strong EU regulations. Turn to the restriction of the EU’s tax policy mandate to matters 
of market integration next. This restriction was also meant to defend national tax 
autonomy by excluding the fiscal and distributive aspects of taxation from EU 
consideration. In effect, however, it biases EU tax legislation and jurisprudence towards 
ignoring these aspects. This is why the ECJ persistently refuses to consider the fiscal 
fall-out of its tax jurisprudence and why fiscal self-interest is often denounced as a 
national atavism in Council negotiations. Thus, inadvertently, the restriction of the EU’s 
policy mandate may increase rather than decrease the risk of unwanted EU constraints 
on national tax autonomy.  
Take the unanimity rule last. It is a common fallacy among policy makers and policy 
analysts to assume that unanimous decision making secures high policy autonomy for 
the member states.103 The underlying intuition seems compelling: as long as every 
single member state can strike down any new Commission proposal, the autonomy of 
each member state is safe from EU intrusion. However, this view overlooks the 
constraining effect of accumulated old decisions. Legislation is indeed difficult to adopt 
under unanimity. But legislation once adopted is also difficult to change because any 
change requires unanimity again. Unanimous decision-making may thus lock the 
member states into a legal status quo many or even most of them no longer like but 
cannot agree how to change. National tax autonomy is lost in the “joint decision 
trap”.104 While the effect of the trap may be mitigated by selective derogations – as we 
have seen, a large share of secondary tax legislation authorizes derogations from 
European tax law to individual member states (see table 1) – the passage of these 
derogations still requires a unanimous agreement of the Council. This may not be 
forthcoming.  
When, for example, the German government asked for a derogation from European 
VAT law in 2007 in order to introduce a new, allegedly more fraud-proof, system of tax 
collection, it was turned down and forced to continue applying the old EU-mandated 
system.105 Note that the unanimity requirement also raises the barriers to overruling 
judicial decisions.106 This increases the discretion of the ECJ and puts the member states 
at risk of being locked into a judicial reading of the law that contradicts their original 
legislative intent. As is well known, the barriers to a political correction of ECJ 
decisions are particularly high when the interpretation of Treaty provisions is 
concerned: Treaty amendments require unanimous intergovernmental agreement plus 
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subsequent ratification by national parliaments. Thus, ironically, the ECJ enjoys most 
discretion to impose judge-made rules in precisely those policy fields in which the 
member states are least able to agree on common legislative rules.107 The ECJ’s 
activities in the direct tax field provide a good example. Many tax lawyers argue that by 
poking holes into domestic corporate tax systems, the ECJ tries to nudge the Council 
into agreement on a harmonized European system.108 The risk is of course, that the ECJ 
ends up destroying domestic tax systems while the Council remains incapable of 
agreeing on common European solutions.109 The Council’s hesitance to embrace the 
Commission’s ideas for a common consolidated corporate tax base highlights this 
risk.110 But even if the Council adopted a common European system it would do so in 
response to incentives set by the ECJ and not out of a genuine desire of its 
democratically elected members. 
In conclusion, our analysis of the fiscal architecture of the EU shows a constitutional 
reality which substantially differs from the standard model of the EU. While the EU has 
not been able to acquire any autonomous taxing power, it has imposed substantial 
regulatory constraints on the taxing power of the member states. This regulatory 
encroachment took place despite the explicit desire of the member states to retain their 
tax autonomy and despite the Treaty safeguards intended to protect it. In fact, these 
purported safeguards contributed to undermining autonomy.111 Our findings thus 
contradict a state-centric reading of Europe’s multilevel polity. They show that the 
member states have lost control not only of policy processes but also of constitutional 
developments in the EU. However, the regulatory framing of EU tax policy tends to 
conceal how deeply it affects national tax policy choices. The conventional wisdom 
according to which the EU is limited to politically inconspicuous market regulation and 
the member states control politically salient issues such as taxation seems in need of 
modification.  
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